MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
for the implementation of a European Concerted Research Action
designated as

COST A28
Human Rights, Peace and Security in EU Foreign Policy

The Signatories to this Memorandum of Understanding, declaring their common intention to participate in the concerted Action referred to above and described in the Technical Annex to the Memorandum, have reached the following understanding:

1. The Action will be carried out in accordance with the provisions of document COST 400/01 "Rules and Procedures for Implementing COST Actions", the contents of which the Signatories are fully aware of.

2. The main objective of the Action is to increase and deepen knowledge on the functioning of national and international instruments devised to pursue human rights, peace and security objectives in order to recommend modifications of the foreign policy of the European Union.

3. The economic dimension of the activities carried out under the Action has been estimated, on the basis of information available during the planning of the Action, at Euro 7 million in 2003 prices.

4. The Memorandum of Understanding will take effect on being signed by at least five Signatories.

5. The Memorandum of Understanding will remain in force for a period of 4 years, calculated from the date of first meeting of the Management Committee, unless the duration of the Action is modified according to the provisions of Chapter 6 of the document referred to in Point 1 above.
TECHNICAL ANNEX

COST A28

Human Rights, Peace and Security in EU Foreign Policy

Two sides of the same coin
Evaluating combined instruments to promote human rights and to enhance peace and security in order to strengthen EU foreign policy in this area

A. Background
The end of the bipolar balance of power created a vacuum in many parts of the world. Religious and ethnic conflicts that had often been smouldering away beneath the surface burst out into the open, resulting in gross, systematic violations of human rights. The Balkan region was ravaged by civil war and ethnic cleansing. The transformation of the formerly communist-run countries of the Eastern Bloc progressed by fits and starts, their economic decline a constant threat to their fledging democracies. In Africa countries like Somalia and Rwanda were wrought with genocide and anarchy.

Such developments spurred the widespread belief that human rights are inherent to the promotion of peace, security, prosperity and social equity. National governments and inter-governmental and supranational organisations including the United Nations increasingly insist that respect for human rights is a condition for political stability and socio-economic progress. Several strategies were employed:

1) ‘Mainstreaming’ human rights in already existing peace and security instruments, for instance in UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations
2) Redesigning national and international development aid programmes as proactive instruments to improve human rights conditions and to restore or strengthen peace and security
3) Creating new instruments that contribute to the implementation of both human rights and peace:
   • International ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
   • A permanent International Criminal Court created by the Rome Statute
   • The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) were established as new implementation and co-ordination instruments

The international impact of these instruments has been far reaching, raising several questions about their effectiveness and compatibility hitherto not answered by the research community. Several challenges must be addressed:

- Ignatieff states that peace keeping is out of date as a means for stability and human rights protection. Most post-1989 conflicts were violent conflicts in crumbling or disintegrating states, often accompanied by ethnic cleansing practices. ‘In these conditions there is not only no peace to keep but no credible position of neutrality either’.¹

- Abiew identifies an emerging international consensus on humanitarian military intervention, but agrees with Weiss that such UN operations are poorly executed. The international community fails, partly because governments are ‘particularly prone to crisis induced reactions chosen for their symbolic value and ease of execution rather than their decisive effect’.  


- Tomaševski criticises how development aid has been used to support electoral processes as a means to enhance peace, democracy and human rights. In Angola and Cambodia international election aid replaced conventional aid as a cheap quick fix, ignoring the need for a working civil service, judicial system and economy.  


- Concerning international criminal procedures to prosecute crimes against humanity, Forsythe argues that they do not break cycles of humanitarian violence. And they may not enhance peace and security: the Rwanda tribunal did not deter new upheavals of ethnic violence in the Great Lake region of Africa. In the Balkan crisis it was not a coincidence that the architect of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was only indicted after the realisation of the Dayton peace agreement. Would a peace settlement have been possible, had criminal prosecution of the responsible officials been a non-negotiable demand?  


- Fletcher and Weinstein also question the value added of criminal trials for reconciliation, human rights, peace and security. Even seven years after establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Croatian, Serb and Muslim judges in Bosnia all reject notions of collective guilt.


- With regard to the functioning of the UNHCR as a coordinating and early warning mechanism, UN watchers Alston and Schmidt warn that its vague mandate limits its functioning as ‘the United Nations official with principal responsibility for United Nations human rights activities’.


- Ignatieff concludes, regarding the HCNM as an instrument of conflict prevention, that the focus has been unduly restricted to the former East Bloc. Hardly anywhere else can the HCNM entice states to comply with international standard of minority protection. The prospect of eventual integration into European and economic institutions is the crucial
carrot. The HCNM’s mandate also prohibits interference in minority questions involving organised acts of terrorism. Western states like Turkey, Spain and the UK have used this to preclude HCNM interference with the Basque, Kurdish and Northern Irish minority problems. 8

Thus we do not know whether these instruments contribute effectively to the international protection of human rights and the maintenance of peace and security. Yet, EU foreign policy has increasingly acknowledged the inter-relationship between human rights, peace and security:

1) Mainstreaming human rights in the Common Foreign Security policy (CFSP) of the EU (Pillar II). The character of the political co-operation between the EU member states in the field of foreign policy was strengthened and became more binding by formulating the CFSP framework as part of the 1992 Treaty on the European Union (TEU). Explicit objectives of the CFSP include the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

2) Mainstreaming human rights, peace and security objectives in the development co-operation policy of the European Community (Pillar I). Issues of human rights and democracy were included as essential elements in the overall development policy-making process of the European Community in the 1990s. The EC not only relied on development aid as a sanction instrument, but has also increasingly started to deploy aid in support of processes of good governance. This proactive approach includes human rights clauses in financial aid agreements with third countries. These clauses seek to make human rights part of the political dialogue and the implementation of proactive measures. And they provide a legal basis for suspension or restriction of the agreement in the eventuality of unsatisfactory response by the contracting country.

The EC increasingly regards development co-operation as the most powerful instrument for treating root causes of conflict. The 2001 European Commission Communication on conflict prevention emphasises that an integrated approach is needed to restore or consolidate structural stability considering aspects ranging from sustainable economic development to democracy and respect for human rights. A striking example was the Stabilisation and Association Process starting 1999 to maintain peace and to avoid conflict in the Western Balkans. The countries were given prospects of integration in the EU structures provided that they complied with conditions regarding human rights, minority protection, good governance and democratic principles.

The analysis and evaluation of these new instruments for human rights and peace and security is hence of great practical value for the evolving external policies of the European Union.

Many separate studies, policy papers and political debates on these issues are found at the national level. What lacks is:

1) An integration of the results of national studies and discussions regarding the functioning of separate instruments at the international level

2) An integration of internationally based evaluations on each instrument in a comparative framework as:

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- An instrument for policy recommendations to national and international authorities
- A statement of the present state of knowledge, as the basis for new advanced joint research activities among leading centres of excellence in the field of human rights/peace and security studies.

These needs can be met by a flexible network based on an evaluative approach addressing a broad main question with easily adaptable sets of sub-questions. The flexible framework of COST would be the most appropriate mechanism to start this process.

B. Objectives and benefits

Objectives
The main objective of the Action is to increase and deepen knowledge on the functioning of national and international instruments devised to pursue human rights, peace and security objectives in order to recommend modifications of the foreign policy of the European Union.

Scientific benefits
An international network will be created consisting of European human rights institutes, several of which co-operate as the Association of Human Rights Institutes (AHRI), established in 2000. Some AHRI-institutes are leading research centres in the field of human rights studies, nationally and internationally. Their multidisciplinary study of human rights issues from juridical, social-scientific as well as normative and historical perspectives, adds value to the quality and completeness of the implementation of this Action.

New jointly implemented research activities will be developed on the basis of the evaluation of existing studies. To increase the interaction between the national research communities, the institutes will exchange senior as well as junior PhD researchers.

The results of the Action will be spread among the scientific community by publishing reports, articles and books, securing quality control of the findings. In addition, the results will be integrated within the educational programs of the participating institutes. A considerable number of the students following these curricula will constitute the next generation of national and EU policy makers in the field of human rights, peace and security.

Policy benefits for the EU
In June 2001, the Council of Ministers of the European Union reaffirmed its determination to promote stable democratic environments founded on the full enjoyment of human rights. This is considered an essential objective for implementing the European Programme for the Prevention of Conflicts, and central to poverty reduction, sustainable social and economic development, peace and security. The Council suggested in its conclusions to explore a possible EU common strategy of human rights and democratisation.9 This Action contributes to this aim by analysing and evaluating combined instruments to promote international human rights, peace and security. The comparative and forward looking focus offers policymakers at national and EU levels a useful instrument to refine and strengthen EU external policies in this field.

C. Scientific Programme

**C1:** The first part of this Action analyses to what extent certain instruments have been successful in pursuing human rights, peace and security objectives. These instruments include peacekeeping/enforcement, international criminal tribunals, development co-operation, and the UNHCHR and the HCNM.

The pan-European network Association of Human Rights Institutes (AHRI), together with other institutes from countries that will participate in this Action, will:

1. Bring together at the European level the results of national academic studies, policy papers and political debates on the functioning of separate peace and security/human rights instruments. The result will be internationally based evaluations of each of these instruments
2. Bring together in an integrated comparative framework internationally based evaluations on separate instruments as aimed for under 1 above
3. Enhance the evaluation by interviewing relevant governmental officials, policy makers, judges, and military at a national level in order to include their practical experiences with the instruments
4. On the basis of discerned gaps in the scientific research set up a research agenda for the future and initiate jointly started research activities.

An additional value of evaluating these instruments in a comparative framework is to contribute to the ongoing debate in academic and political circles: Should more emphasis be put on deploying preventive mechanisms to protect human rights, peace and security, instead of relying one-sidedly on reactive mechanisms?

Within the UN system there is not necessarily a proper balance between emphasis and funding of reactive and proactive instruments, looking at the budget of the criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and of many under-funded activities of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. A comparative evaluation on the use of positive mechanisms (development co-operation and the work done by the HCNM and UNHCHR) and reactive instruments (peace keeping/enforcement and international criminal tribunals) may facilitate a critical analysis on the pros and cons of both categories of instruments.

Four working groups will be established. Each will compose a multi-disciplinary, evaluative report on the functioning of the instruments.10

**a) Peace keeping/enforcement**

During the 1990s human rights developed into a major objective of peace keeping and peace enforcement operations by becoming a prime motive to interfere or by becoming an essential part of the implementation of operations. Tasks included military protection of humanitarian relief operations, the creation of safe areas for threatened minorities, and (re)building democratic state structures. The recent past also casts doubt on the use of peace keeping and peace enforcement as effective means to protect human rights. In Bosnia and Kosovo the international community only succeeded in freezing an ethnic civil war, forcing peacekeeping forces to stay for a long time.

It is important to determine whether the flawed record of peace operations is the result of inability or instead unwillingness on the side of the international community to take

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10 The scientific programmes of the four working groups are set up in a broad way. It is not excluded that priorities will need to be set at the start of the Action. In the course of time new sub-themes may be included in the domains of each working group.
appropriate action. Other important facts that should affect the assessment and future use of instruments include peace enforcers/keepers who became explicit violators of human rights (Somalia). In other cases they became, at least morally, accessories, when declining to intervene in grave violations of humanitarian law (Srebrenica). Sometimes one-sided reliance on specific military instruments could easily cause casualties among the civilian population (high altitude air strikes in Kosovo).

Another question to be addressed concerns the political, moral and legal grounds justifying the use of non-authorised military violence to end grave violations of fundamental human rights that threaten international peace and security. This issue is especially perplexing when the UN Security Council is unable or unwilling to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. A central task for this analysis is to assess the benefits and risks of institutionalising international interventions on behalf of human rights. The likely benefits are sometimes overrated, and the very real risks of abuse might be overlooked. Governments may come to use alleged human rights violations as an excuse for illegitimate interference – unilaterally or even with multilateral backing. In turn, threats of such interventions may be used for non-humanitarian ends. The balance of benefits and risks may be improved by careful design of standards and procedures as a result of this research.

b) International criminal tribunals

In the 1990s the UN Security Council used Chapter VII of the UN Charter beyond the deployment of peace enforcement to end humanitarian catastrophes. The Security Council also established international criminal tribunals to punish individual violators for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The establishment of both ad hoc tribunals or the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda paved the way for the creation of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) that entered into force in July 2002.

Transitional justice scholars often refer to the deterrent effect of tribunals to prevent new violations. However, until the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002, international tribunals have been established after acts of mass violence. An evaluative analysis on the functioning of international tribunals must therefore consider whether criminal prosecution has real preventive effect, and whether it might replace earlier meaningful action, thus only creating an illusion of progress.

The analysis also considers the limits of international criminal procedures to enforce both human rights, peace and security. International criminal procedures are faced with a dilemma between peace and justice, perhaps more so than any of the other instruments analysed as a part of this Action. Pursuit of criminal prosecutions may prevent political agreements to end fighting among combatants and the attacks on civilians. If national reconciliation after mass violence becomes necessary to guarantee peace and human rights in the long term, one must also ask whether prosecution of individual perpetrators add to this objective. Does individual accountability alleviate the collective guilt by differentiating between perpetrators and innocent bystanders? Or do such procedures allow individuals and groups excuses to rationalise or deny their own responsibility for crimes committed in their name?

c) Development co-operation

In the 1990s western governments increasingly used their declining aid budgets to stimulate human rights, democratisation and the rule of law (“good governance”). These objectives were regarded as key to supplant conflict and to restore and strengthen peace and stability. Several western countries have used development aid as a conditional instrument. Nowadays,
this strategy is often replaced by a more ‘positive’ approach. An open and constructive
dialogue with the target country identifies useful initiatives that may strengthen democratic
and judicial institutions, promote NGOs and a pluralist society, or enhance equal
opportunities for all. This version of development co-operation is often referred to as a
‘human rights based approach’, linking empowerment of the poor to international agreements
on political, economic, social and cultural rights.

Although there are many reasons to prefer positive over negative measures, positive measures
may also have unfortunate effects - especially when the political context is not taken into
consideration. Important questions remain: Should the ‘philosophy’ of the positive approach
also be maintained where human rights violations continue, even in cases where the financial
aid may prolong abuses? Should donors only pursue the positive approach, or combining
positive aid measures with aid conditionality? The analysis will use the experiences of
international organisations and national donors in the last decade to address these questions.
Also with regards to this instrument it is important to determine the risks of institutionalising
opportunities of international interference with domestic policy decisions. Donor governments
may allege human rights violations for illegitimate pressure in ‘dialogues’, or threaten to
withhold aid in pursuit of quite non-humanitarian objectives.

\textit{d) The UNHCHR (including other parts of the UN human rights programme) and the
HCNM}

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the High Commissioner on National
Minorities of the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are preventive
instruments in the field of protecting human rights and maintaining peace and security. This is
especially clear in the case of the HCNM, whose mandate is to solve ethnic conflicts before
they develop into violent upheavals. The responsibilities and competences of the UNHCHR
are much less specific. However, the UNHCHR, has interpreted its mandate not only to
monitor but to prevent human rights violations. More emphasis is given to human rights field
presences as ‘early warning mechanisms’. The UNHCHR also uses its human rights dialogues
with governments as a means to prevent (further) abuses.

Both the UNHCHR and the HCNM are relatively young mechanisms with restricted financial
budgets. The staffs are still strengthening and proving their existence within the larger
organisations that created them. Especially at this time it is highly important to determine
whether the HCNM and UNHCHR have been effective in the implementation of their
preventive tasks.

More specifically, the following questions are addressed in an evaluative and comparative
analysis on the functioning of both High Commissioners: How successful have the early
warning activities of the UNHCHR been so far, against the background of scarce resources?
What are the limits of the political dialogue as an instrument to improve the protection of
human rights and to prevent conflict? The first UNHCHR, José Ayala-Lasso, trusted the
instrument of \textit{quiet diplomacy}, his successor Mary Robinson operated from a more activist
point of view. The analysis will include a comparison with the functioning of the first HCNM,
Max van der Stoel, who also preferred to operate beyond the glare of publicity in order to
prevent the outbreak of ethnic conflict. Thus we may gain more insight regarding the value
and proper use of closed and public dialogues. Regarding the HCNM, the limited powers and
restricted mandate has resulted in a heavy focus on minority questions in the countries of the
former communist bloc. It remains to be determined whether this has been beneficial to the
functioning of the OCSE as a whole. Especially the Russian Federation increasingly regards the OSCE a paternalist instrument of the West.

C2: The conclusions of the evaluative reports of the working groups on the four different instruments will result in a comprehensive and comparative analysis to be determined by the Management Committee (MC). In part B of the Action this analysis will be used to recommend modifications of the foreign policy of the European Union in the combined area of protecting human rights and maintaining peace and security.

1) A critical and comprehensive analysis is a useful instrument when the EU evaluates its participation in the implementation and further development of the international instruments mentioned above. The EU may strengthen its focus on the decision making process in the framework of the UN Security Council, where the EU member states France and the United Kingdom have permanent seats. With regard to initiating peace keeping/enforcement operations, and international criminal law procedures, the UN Security Council occupies a dominant position. Nevertheless, recent research indicates that the EU still regards the Security Council mainly as a forum for security issues. As a result, EU human rights policy is currently isolated from discussions of human rights in the Security Council.

2) Evaluating the functioning and effectiveness of international institutions like the High Commissioners and the deployment of development co-operation assists the EU’s own autonomous policies in the field of human rights, peace and security:
   a) A critical analysis of development aid as a preventive mechanism may improve European Community policy in this field. The proactive approach within the EC development co-operation programs can sometimes have dubious results, demonstrated by the EC policy towards the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, which in 1997 received preferential trade status and a new aid package. It has been questioned whether this was sensible, given the ongoing human rights violations in this country. Moreover, the EC policy did not prevent the new climax in 1999 with the brutal repression of the Albanian population in Kosovo, which triggered off outside intervention.
   b) The EU will consider a better and more transparent and coherent implementation of human rights objectives in the larger area of EU external policies. EU foreign policy has often been criticised for its lack of coherence and decisiveness. One reason is EU states’ concern to reserve enough room for autonomous national policies. For this assessment, it will be helpful to draw on a critical assessment of the functioning of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights as a co-ordinating mechanism devised to mainstream human rights in all other UN activities.

3) A comparative analysis between the effectiveness of mainly reactive instruments (international criminal tribunals and peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations) and mainly proactive instruments (development co-operation and the activities of the High Commissioners) is required when redefining EU policies. A positive assessment of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights may support stronger EU encouragement of UNHCHR field presence - such as support of the European Commission for a permanent office of the UNHCHR in Colombia. A positive assessment of proactive instruments could lead the EU to emphasise the recently established Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit within the General Secretariat of the Council. The functions for this Unit
include monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. It shall also provide timely assessments and early warning of events or situations with significant repercussions for the Union’s foreign and security policy, including potential political crises.

D. Organisation
The Action will be guided by the usual COST structure. The framework of the Action will include a Management Committee (MC), working groups, two expert seminars and a final international conference.

Both the MC and the working groups will come together once a year, except for year 1 and 4 when the MC will have extra meetings: in the first year to elaborate on the work plan before the working groups can make a definitive start, and in the fourth and last year to finalise the definitive report of the Action and to prepare an international conference to conclude the Action.

Normally the meetings of the working groups and the MC will be organised together. This facilitates exchange of information between the working groups while at the same time allowing the Management Committee to co-ordinate the work of the different groups as effectively as possible. This also reduces costs, since individual researchers will participate in more than one research domain.

The meetings of the working groups will result in progress reports on the functioning of the different instruments in year 2 and year 3, on the basis of which definite evaluative reports on each instrument will be published in year 4.

The MC, cooperating with the working groups, will develop a comparative analysis on the basis of the working group reports. This analysis will be discussed during two expert seminars in year 2 and 3. Participants in these seminars will include representatives of the Management Committee, the four working groups and a selected number of external European experts (members of the academic community as well as policymakers from the national and the international level).

The seminars will also serve as a forum for making recommendations for modifications of EU foreign policy in the combined area of human rights, peace and security. The discussions of the last seminar will serve as the basis for composing a definitive and integral Action report with final recommendations for the external policy of the European Union.

The Action will be concluded with an international conference at which the findings from the report will be presented to a broad audience of scientists and policymakers from the national as well as the EU level.

Both the conference proceedings and the final report of the Action will be published. Additionally, a special website will be established to convey the aims, objectives and results of the Action to policy makers and other scientists. The website will also be used to stimulate regular contact between the members of the respective working groups and between the different working groups. For each working group a special 'meeting room' will be created which will be accessible for every member of each working group, including all members of the Management Committee.
E. Timetable
The duration of the Action will be four years:

Year 1:
- First meeting of the MC
  Elaborate work plan of the Action
- Meeting MC and working groups

Year 2:
- Meeting MC and working groups
  Presentation of first series of progress reports; preparation first draft comparative analysis; preparation first expert seminar
  First expert seminar

Year 3:
- Meeting MC and working groups
  Presentation second series of progress reports; preparation second draft comparative analysis; preparation second expert seminar
  Second expert seminar

Year 4:
- Meeting MC and working groups
  Presentation definite evaluative reports working groups; determination definite comparative analysis; preparation Action report including recommendations for EU foreign policy.
- Extra meeting MC
  Finalisation Action report and preparation concluding international conference
- International conference

F. Economic dimension
The following COST countries have actively participated in the preparation of the Action or otherwise indicated their interest: The Netherlands (proposing country), Austria, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Sweden and United Kingdom

On the basis of national estimates provided by the representatives of these countries, the economic dimension of the activities to be carried out under the Action has been estimated, in 2003 prices, at roughly Euro 7 million.

This estimate is valid under the assumption that all the countries mentioned above but no other countries will participate in the Action. Any departure from this will change the total cost accordingly.
G. Dissemination plan
The target audiences of this COST Action are:

- The academic community: that is senior/junior researchers and university students practitioners in the field: that is national and EU policy makers active in the field of foreign policy, human rights, peace and security

To reach both groups a specific set of communication channels will be used:

1. The expert seminars in year 2 and 3 of the Action will be directed at a selected number of external experts in the field of human rights, peace and security and more specifically in the field of the EU external policies concerning these topics (academics and practitioners in the field), in addition to members of the different working groups and the Management Committee of the Action

2. The international conference concluding the Action in year 4 will be open to 200 participants from the academic community and the community of policy makers at the national as well as the EU-level

3. The results of the two series of progress reports of the working groups and the summaries and conclusions of the two expert seminars will be published on the public part of the website of the Action

4. The final report of the Action and the proceedings of the international conference will be published. Copies of the final report and the conference book will be sent to all Foreign Ministries of the member countries of the EU including the relevant bodies of the European Union, to disseminate the results of the Action among policymakers from the national as well as the EU level

5. Researchers participating in the Action will be stimulated to publish the (interim) results of the Action in academic journals, to present them at other seminars and conferences, and to integrate them in the educational programs of their institutes
Additional information

Historical background of the proposal

The idea of this COST Action was born during the second annual meeting of the Association of Human Rights Institutes (AHRI) in May 2002 in order to increase academic co-operation and interaction between European centres of excellence in the field of human rights studies by developing and implementing joint research projects on relevant and actual topics.

The multidisciplinary network of the Association of Human Rights Institutes consisting of researchers from several academic disciplines (law, political sciences, philosophy and history) was established in 2000 to strengthen the already informal co-operation framework between institutes from Austria, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries.

The Association, whose objectives are to promote research, education and discussion in the field of human rights, now consists of the following institutes:

- Åbo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights, Finland; Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Serbia and Montenegro; Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights, Austria; Human Rights Centre, Queen’s University, Belfast, Northern Ireland; Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway; Danish Centre for Human Rights; Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, UK; Icelandic Human Rights Center; Institute of Human Rights, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium; Institute of Human Rights, University of Latvia; Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland, Galway; Netherlands Institute of Human Rights (SIM); Norwegian Centre for Human Rights; Poznan Centre for Human Rights, Polish Academy of Sciences; Raul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Sweden.

Membership of the Association is open to human rights institutes and comparable entities on the condition that they have a demonstrably independent and academic status.

Participating institutes

- Netherlands Institute of Human Rights (SIM) (proposing institute)
- Åbo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights, Finland
- Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway
- Human Rights Centre, Queen’s University, Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK
- Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland, Galway
- Norwegian Centre for Human Rights

Potential participating institutes

Other AHRI-members and institutions or persons with the required expertise to participate in this COST Action.

Experts who have participated in the drafting of this proposal

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Selected list of publications by the experts who have participated in the drafting of the proposal

Nils Butenschøn
- N. Butenschøn, *The Oslo Agreement in Norwegian Foreign Policy* (Durham: CMEIS Occational Papers, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham, 1997).

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